

11 APRIL 1973

#15-73

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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F B I S

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
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12 April 1973

C O R R E C T I O N

TO FBIS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, 11 APRIL 1973

In the Indochina section, page 7, final paragraph, the first two lines should read: Without mentioning the President, VNA indicated by the use of internal quotation marks that it was quoting from him X X X (correcting typographical error)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 2 - 8 APRIL 1973

Moscow (3319 items)

Podgorny in Finland	(--)	15%
[Podgorny Speeches	(--)	7%]
Kosygin in Sweden	(--)	8%
[Kosygin Speeches	(--)	6%]
Vietnam	(11%)	8%
[Madame Binh in USSR	(3%)	3%]
Hungarian National Day	(--)	5%
China	(6%)	3%
Anniversary of 24th	(9%)	3%
CPSU Congress		

Peking (1000 items)

Domestic Issues	(43%)	49%
Vietnam	(10%)	11%
UN Seabed Meetings,	(3%)	9%
Superpower		
"Maritime Hegemony"		
Cambodia	(7%)	5%
[Sihanouk in DRV	(--)	2%]
Cameroon President in	(18%)	5%
PRC		
Soviet Economic	(--)	3%
Exploitation of		
Czechoslovakia		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Sihanouk resurfaced for the first time since mid-February when he arrived in Hanoi on the 6th after a visit to "the liberated zone of Cambodia." His reported consultations with the in-country FUNK leaders underscored a differentiation of roles in which Sihanouk represents the FUNK on the international plane while acknowledging the insurgents' own leadership in conducting operations in Cambodia. His visit also reaffirmed the FUNK's rejection of an accommodation or cease-fire with the Phnom Penh regime. Hanoi and Peking have hailed his trip as a demonstration of the FUNK's unity.

Speeches by Pham Van Dong, hosting Sihanouk, and Truong Chinh, hosting a visiting Czechoslovak delegation, reiterated Hanoi's line that the completion of U.S. troop withdrawal on 29 March was a great victory for the Vietnamese people. Both DRV leaders charged the United States and Saigon with "gross and systematic" violation of the peace accord, and Truong Chinh scored the U.S. Administration for "hurling slanders and threats" at the Vietnamese people.

Hanoi press comment on GVN President Nguyen Van Thieu's 2-7 April visit to the United States contained more direct reaction to the recent Administration statements warning of U.S. measures to counter communist violations of the peace accord. Citing such statements by the President and by Defense Secretary Richardson, a NHAN DAN editorial pegged to the Nixon-Thieu communique argued that it is not the U.S. role to enforce the peace agreement. The Hanoi press comment viewed the joint communique as evidence of U.S. intent to pursue the Nixon Doctrine and thus impose "neocolonialist domination," and a Commentator article injected a polemical note when it revived the charge that the doctrine aims at dividing socialist countries.

SIHANOUK VISITS HANOI AFTER REPORTED TRIP TO CAMBODIA

Prince Sihanouk arrived in Hanoi on 6 April after what he said was a visit to "the liberated zone of Cambodia" that has produced a show of unity between Sihanouk's exile wing of the FUNK and the in-country insurgent leaders identified with the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk's pilgrimage appears to have achieved an understanding based on a differentiation of roles within the FUNK, with the prince representing the movement on the international plane while acknowledging the insurgents' own leadership of operations inside

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Cambodia. His consultations with the insurgent leaders also reconfirmed their rejection of an accommodation or cease-fire with the Phnom Penh regime. Earlier, Sihanouk had drawn back from the more forthcoming approach to a Cambodian settlement that he had taken in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam agreement.

Speaking at an official reception in his honor in Hanoi on the 9th, Sihanouk frankly acknowledged that for three years the FUNK has been afflicted with "a serious handicap" arising from his exile status, which has made the FUNK politically vulnerable to charges that it did not have a genuine domestic base, that the in-country insurgents did not recognize his authority, and that these insurgents were dominated by their Vietnamese allies. Declaring that the time has come for his movement to demonstrate "its existence, its unity, its autonomy, and its legitimacy," Sihanouk insisted that the three Khmer Rouge "ministers in the interior"--Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Hou Youn*--are alive and well and that they recognize him as chief of state. He explained that the RGNU was not a government in exile because it is embodied in the three insurgent leaders and has established "the people's power" in 90 percent of Cambodia.

In his insistent stress on the unity of the FUNK, especially between the royalist and the communist elements, Sihanouk indicated that there was an arrangement according to which he represented the continuity and legitimacy of the resistance movement on the international level while the insurgent leaders provided "a veritable national leadership in the liberated zones" of the country. He explained, in an exercise of semantic gymnastics, that the RGNU will always call itself a royal government--"even if it is composed of a majority" of Khmer Rouge--but that as a regime it will always be "a pure people's democracy." He added that the monarchy has become purely symbolic, a concession that makes clear the effective control to be enjoyed by the communist elements should they oust the Lon Nol regime.

On 8 April the FUNK radio began carrying a series of special programs of recorded reportage on Sihanouk's visit, including

* Sihanouk said he had gathered photographs, film, and recordings of speeches by the three ministers as well as by Son Sen, the insurgent army's chief of staff. Current references to the latter further reflect the deference being shown in recent months to the fighters on the front line.

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speeches by the prince and purportedly by the insurgent leaders.* As in his remarks in Hanoi, Sihanouk's speeches showed sensitivity to what he called "the degrading brand" of a government in exile, and his tributes to the leaders of the insurgent forces reflected the trend in recent months toward enhancing their authority. He also took frank note of views that the FUNK is divided into four factions--the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese-dominated Khmer Rumdoh, pro-Sihanouk elements, and outright bandits--and that the three shadowy ministers in the interior had been murdered long before at Sihanouk's orders. He expressed confidence that his visit and the evidence he collected will demonstrate to doubting Cambodians and to the world that the FUNK is united and that the insurgent leaders are alive and heading the struggle at home. VNA has transmitted radiophotos with captions saying that they show Sihanouk with other FUNK leaders in the "liberated zone," including one purportedly in front of the Angkor Wat temple.

REJECTION OF COMPROMISE In his recorded speeches and in his 9 April address in Hanoi, Sihanouk underscored the FUNK's adamant opposition to a compromise settlement. Addressing would-be "Indochina peacemakers," he said in Hanoi that the insurgent leaders had asked him to tell the world that they would not accept any compromise or "any cease-fire whatsoever" with the Phnom Penh regime. In a recorded speech broadcast by the FUNK radio on the 10th, Sihanouk declared that "we resolutely refuse to negotiate or compromise" and will continue the war until complete liberation of the country.

On the question of aid from the Chinese and the North Vietnamese, Sihanouk said in Hanoi that they had provided a stock of supplies prior to 27 January sufficient to carry on the fight until 1975 and that large quantities of American arms are captured from Lon Nol's army. He appealed to foreign governments seeking to bring peace to Cambodia to urge President Nixon to stop the U.S. air attacks. Sihanouk indicated that the FUNK forces will not attempt to take Phnom Penh by force but will use "political and diplomatic means" to isolate the Lon Nol regime and cause its internal collapse.

* The first installment carried a recorded speech attributed to Hu Nim and the second a speech by Khieu Samphan.

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SUPPORT FROM DRV Hanoi took the occasion of Sihanouk's visit to reaffirm its support for his leadership while hailing his reported trip into Cambodia as demonstrating the unity of the resistance forces. As in his previous visit in late January and early February, Sihanouk was hosted by Premier Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Giap. Unlike that visit, this time he met with party chief Le Duan, who along with Truong Chinh paid separate calls on Sihanouk and RGNU Premier Penn Nouth on 8 April. (Penn Nouth had flown to the DRV from Peking on the 5th to join Sihanouk and his Khmer Rouge shadow, "special envoy of the interior" Ieng Sary.) North Vietnamese comment, including editorials in the party and army dailies, reconfirmed Hanoi's backing of Sihanouk as the "representative of the legality, genuineness, and continuity of the Cambodian state."

Speaking at the reception on the 9th, Dong hailed Sihanouk's trip as "a new and still more moving and vivid manifestation of the militant solidarity" of the Cambodians and Vietnamese, who "are ready to give mutual wholehearted support and assistance." He said Sihanouk's visit to the liberated zone coincided with battlefield successes, "especially on the strategic communication lines," which have tightened the siege on Phnom Penh and driven "the reactionary clique of Lon Nol" to the point of collapse. Dong reaffirmed Hanoi's support for Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point declaration but did not directly address the question of a Cambodian settlement.

RETURN TO CHINA Sihanouk's party arrived from Hanoi in Peking on the 11th and was greeted by more than 5,000 people headed by Chou En-lai and his wife, Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, and PRG Foreign Minister Binh, stopping over in Peking en route to North Korea from Mongolia. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial trumpeted that Sihanouk's "inspection tour of the liberated zone of Cambodia" is having "a great impact" both inside and outside Cambodia by demonstrating anew his status as legitimate head of state and "the unbreakable unity" of the FUNK forces. Echoing Sihanouk's remarks, the editorial claimed that the trip has "shattered to smithereens" the objection that the RGNU is a government in exile. The editorial heaped all the glory on Peking's client, Sihanouk, neglecting to mention by name the insurgent leaders to whom Sihanouk had paid repeated tributes.

Observing that the Lon Nol regime is being isolated and that the flames of war are spreading, PEOPLE'S DAILY asserted that the days of "this handful of national scum" are numbered. The editorial said Sihanouk's five-point declaration advanced "reasonable

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proposals" that are widely supported in the world, but it did not claim that these proposals provide the only basis for a settlement. It also sidestepped the question of a cease-fire settlement while taking the occasion to condemn the U.S. air strikes in Cambodia as a violation of the Paris agreement on Vietnam as well as a futile attempt to "drag on the solution" of the Cambodian question. The editorial concluded with a routine pledge that the Chinese will always "firmly support the just struggle" of the Cambodians and other Indochinese people.

Moscow, as the outside party in Sihanouk's dealings with the Asian communists, has not mentioned the prince's travels.

THIEU'S U.S. VISIT PROMPTS DRV ANALYSES OF NIXON POLICIES

In the wake of President Thieu's U.S. visit, a spate of authoritative comment in Hanoi's party paper NHAN DAN shows some variations, if not contradictions, in analyzing U.S. policies. An editorial in the paper on 6 April is straightforward in citing the Nixon-Thieu communique as evidence of U.S. intent to continue its involvement in Vietnam and Indochina. But a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 7th and an editorial in the paper on the 9th take different tacks toward the United States, with the Commentator article carrying polemical overtones regarding U.S. intentions and great power detente and the editorial assuming a more sanguine stance regarding the President's professions of a desire to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.

DRV PRESS ON U.S. THREATS Analyzing the 3 April Nixon-Thieu communique in some detail, the NHAN DAN editorial of the 6th charged that the document provided further evidence of continuing U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Indochina and of Thieu's willingness to continue "serving as a U.S. lackey." The editorial focused particular attention on the communique's "slanderous" reference to North Vietnamese infiltration and its assertion that appropriate vigorous reactions would be necessary to meet any actions which threaten the basis of the peace agreement. Interpreting this passage as a warning that the United States would intervene, the editorial charged that Defense Secretary Richardson had indicated that U.S. action might include a resumption of the U.S. bombing of the DRV and even the reintroduction of American forces into South Vietnam. Not surprisingly, Vietnamese communist media have ignored statements by Thieu--including those at the National Press Club on the 5th and in his Face the Nation TV interview on the 8th--that South Vietnam will not require the reintroduction of U.S. troops or U.S. air support.

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In contrast to its previous stress on alleged U.S. responsibility for insuring Saigon's compliance with the peace accord, Hanoi now argues that the United States has no supervisory authority. Thus, the NHAN DAN editorial on the 6th said: "Nobody has given the United States the right to set itself up as a judge and act whenever there are violations of the agreement." An article in the 4 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN had made a similar point in commenting on Secretary Richardson's 1 April Meet the Press TV interview. The article paraphrased an editorial in the 1 April New York TIMES holding that President Nixon has no right to use force to ensure the implementation of the accord, that the peace agreement provides for the ICCS to deal with violations, and that the United States has acknowledged this control machinery and cannot now demand unlimited free action. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN excised the TIMES' additional observations characterizing the peace-keeping mechanism as unrealistic and ineffectual.)

DIFFERING LINES IN The NHAN DAN Commentator article on 7 April
ARTICLE, EDITORIAL levelled an unusually argumentative attack
 against the Nixon Doctrine. Commentator
 blasted the Nixon-Thieu communique as a "concentrated expression"
of U.S. intent to pursue the Nixon Doctrine in Vietnam and
Indochina, and he went on to say: "It is not that this scheme
was divulged only now." To buttress his point, Commentator cited
a French press article, written before Thieu's trip, which
maintained that the Nixon Doctrine remains unchanged and "is not
a question of concessions."

The likelihood that Commentator was directing his argument at Hanoi's detente-seeking communist allies is bolstered by the fact that in the course of attacking the Nixon Doctrine he revived the charge that the doctrine is aimed, among other things, at creating divisions in the communist world. This charge, first voiced by Hanoi in connection with the July 1971 announcement of the President's planned trip to Peking, has not been pressed since it appeared in an unusually polemical 17 August 1972 NHAN DAN editorial.* The current Commentator article claimed that

* The 17 August NHAN DAN editorial is discussed in the 23 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 1-5. A particularly vituperative article in the December 1972 issue of the party journal HOC TAP had also accused President Nixon of attempting to cause communist disunity but had not claimed that this was part of the Nixon Doctrine. The article, by party Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet, is discussed in the 17 January 1973 TRENDS, page 6.

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the doctrine advocates strengthening U.S. power to "intimidate or purchase" other countries, to "provoke war," to force others to share U.S. responsibilities and oppose revolutionary movements, and "on this basis, to be ready to negotiate with an intention of dividing and provoking the socialist countries and other revolutionary forces in the world."

The Commentator article seems the more noteworthy in that it marks the first appearance of this previously regular byline in NHAN DAN since 9 January--prior to the signing of the peace accord. Over the years, NHAN DAN Commentator articles have been the consistent vehicle for Hanoi's comment on U.S. policy and on major Presidential pronouncements.*

Just two days after the Commentator article appeared, a 9 April NHAN DAN editorial paralleled it in reviewing U.S. strategies and in charging that Washington has attempted to take advantage of "differences and dissensions among the revolutionary forces." However, the editorial was much more optimistic than Commentator about the prospects for future U.S. actions. It maintained that the "complete defeat" of the United States in Vietnam has created a new international balance of forces and a clear possibility for world peace to be maintained and consolidated.

Without mentioning the President, VNA indicated ^{the use of} internal quotation ~~question~~ marks that it was quoting from him in the course of the statement that U.S. losses have forced the United States to "change its policy, 'from the era of confrontation to the era of negotiation.'" The editorial expressed a standard line when it said: "It is common knowledge that the nature of imperialism remains unchanged and the imperialists would launch the most frenzied counterattack wherever there is a relaxation of vigilance." But it went on to bolster the notion that the President could be expected to pursue his professed desire to shift from confrontation to negotiation: "At the same time, the important fact must be recognized that nowadays the world's situation has changed" and the "imperialists" cannot "rule the roost."

* Three articles attributed to Commentator were published in NHAN DAN last December and articles with this byline appeared in the paper every month in 1972 except October.

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PRG PRESSES ROLE AS "SOLE" TRUE REPRESENTATIVE; USSR DEMURS

PRG media have stepped up criticism of claims that the GVN is the only legitimate government in South Vietnam, and joint communiques on PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's recent official visits to the Soviet Union and Mongolia--as transmitted in Front media--have contained the counterclaim that the PRG is the "sole" genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people. The timing suggests that this may be, at least in part, an effort to counterbalance GVN President Thieu's visit to the United States and other countries.

The PRG's sensitivity about its status was underlined in its 1 April government statement marking the completion of U.S. troop withdrawals.* The statement denounced the GVN's claims to be the only legitimate government and charged that Saigon has denied the existence of the PRG and the role of the third force in South Vietnam. And a 7 April LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY editorial on Thieu's visit took issue with the United States for considering the GVN the only legitimate representative of South Vietnam.

The argument was also aired on 4 April in a Liberation Radio interview with PRG Vice Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son, said to have just returned from Paris after participating as deputy head of the delegation to the Paris International Conference on Vietnam. He said the United States and Saigon had been thwarted in their efforts at the conference to gain recognition for the GVN as the only legal government. He also repeated the claim made at the time of the conference that UN Secretary General Waldheim had invited the PRG "to appoint an observer and establish a liaison office" at the United Nations. However, the media have not mentioned a letter from Mme. Binh to Waldehim announcing the appointment of the PRG "observer."**

* Other aspects of the PRG statement are noted in the 4 April 1973 TRENDS, pages 1-2.

** On its Paris-to-Hanoi service channel on 7 April, VNA transmitted--for PRG Vice Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son's attention--a 27 March letter from Foreign Minister Binh to Secretary General Waldheim informing him that Nguyen Van Tien had been named "permanent observer" to the United Nations. Tien had served as deputy chief of the PRG delegation to the four-party Paris conference.

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DIFFERING PRG, USSR The communique issued at the conclusion
VERSIONS OF COMMUNIQUE of Foreign Minister Binh's official
 visit to the Soviet Union (26 March-
2 April) bore the usual label "joint" and thus would have been
expected to reflect agreed positions. However, there is one
striking discrepancy between the texts carried by Soviet and
Front media regarding the status of the PRG. The texts transmitted
by Liberation Radio and LPA refer to the PRG as the "sole
legitimate representative of the aspirations of the South Vietnamese
peoples"; the text as carried by Soviet media omits the modifier
"sole" and calls the PRG "the true spokesman of the aspirations
of the South Vietnamese population"--a formulation consistent with
other Soviet propaganda. Such a discrepancy in versions of a
communique labeled "joint" is highly unusual, and the publicity
surrounding Binh's visit sheds no light on how it may have come
about.

That the PRG's concern to stress the importance of its role in the
South may have been intensified by such recent developments as
Thieu's trip is suggested by the past pattern of its propaganda.
Thus, between the signing of the peace agreement at the end of
January and the release of the communique in Moscow on 2 April,
PRG media had on only two out of 10 occasions added the modifier
"sole" to references to the PRG as the genuine representative.*
Notably, since the peace accord joint communiqués signed by Binh
in Iraq, Syria, and Algeria have not referred to the PRG's
"sole" legitimacy.

Moscow's rendering of the formulation in the communique accords
with Podgornyy's remarks when he awarded the Order of Friendship
to Mme. Binh on 28 March; on that occasion he referred to the PRG
as the "lawful spokesman of the interests of all the South
Vietnamese people." Although Moscow has not gone as far as the
PRG presumably would wish, Soviet commentators have shown some
concern to demonstrate support for the PRG while stressing that,
as the peace accord notes, there are two administrations in the South.
For example, Mayevskiy in an 8 April Moscow radio roundtable
discussion assailed the United States for opposing and obstructing
the idea of a PRG "observer" at the United Nations. He argued
that since there is a Saigon observer at the United Nations, the
United States' stand in opposing a PRG observer is inconsistent with
its having signed the peace accord.

* On the other hand, Hanoi had inserted "sole" in more than half of
some 25 references to the PRG as the genuine representative since
the peace agreement was signed.

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CZECHOSLOVAK ASSEMBLY DELEGATION PAYS FRIENDSHIP VISIT TO DRV

Like an East German delegation's visit last month,* the official friendship visit of a Czechoslovak Federal Assembly delegation to North Vietnam from 4 to 11 April seemed designed chiefly as a show of solidarity and support in the wake of the peace agreement. A recent meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Hanoi had seemed calculated to serve a similar purpose.**

Headed by the Czechoslovak assembly's chairman, Presidium member Alois Indra, the delegation was hosted by Truong Chinh, Politburo member and chairman of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, and was received on the 5th by First Secretary Le Duan, Premier Pham Van Dong, and President Ton Duc Thang. Truong Chinh and Indra spoke at banquets on the 5th and 10th which were attended by Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Hoan, Le Thanh Nghi, and other Hanoi officials. And a 9 April mass rally heard speeches by Indra, Truong Chinh, and Tran Duy Hung, administrative committee chairman of the DRV National Assembly.

A joint DRV-Czechoslovak communique, issued on 11 April, duly affirmed "the fraternal friendship and militant solidarity" between the two peoples and supported "strict respect and scrupulous implementation of the Paris agreement." The communique also registered both parties' "severe" condemnation of the U.S. Government and the Saigon administration for "deliberate, serious, and systematic violations." The GDR-DRV joint communique on 19 March had also placed some of the responsibility for alleged violations on the United States. It has been Moscow's practice, by contrast, to focus its criticism on Saigon, and in apparent deference to the Soviets the PRG-USSR joint communique of 2 April limited its criticism to the GVN.

The DRV-Czechoslovak communique put Prague on record with a pledge to "give all-out assistance to the Vietnamese people in solving the aftermaths of war, rehabilitating the economy, and building socialism." But like the communique on the East German visit, it did not mention any new aid agreement.

* Discussed in the TRENDS of 21 March 1973, pages 5-6.

** The WFTU Bureau held its 7th session in the DRV on 29-30 March, attended by many foreign delegations, including a Soviet delegation led by P. Piminov, secretary of the General Council of Soviet trade unions.

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Both the Czechoslovak and GDR delegations appear to have bowed to Moscow's line on the question of the PRG's position. Both communiques referred to the PRG as the "authentic representative of the South Vietnamese people," while Pham Van Dong in hosting the East Germans and Truong Chinh in hosting the Czechoslovaks called the PRG the "only" true representative of the southern people.

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PRG SPOKESMAN DENIES COMMUNISTS DOWNED ICCS HELICOPTER

Vietnamese communist reaction to the helicopter downing on 7 April, in which four members of the ICCS, two PRG officials, and three crewmen were killed, progressed from initial straightforward reports of the crash to statements seemingly designed to justify the communist action in shooting down the helicopter, and finally to a statement by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 11th denying U.S. charges that the crash resulted from an attack.

Thus VNA's initial report on 7 April noted that the ICCS helicopter, one of two scheduled to fly from Gio Linh to Lao Bao and back, had "crashed at Lao Bao" and that search-and-rescue operations had been ordered. The effort to exculpate the communists began on the 8th, when Hanoi and PRG media publicized a statement by the Quang Tri Provincial People's Revolutionary Committee alleging that the two aircraft had deviated from the assigned flight corridor along Highway 9 and penetrated an area where the Saigon forces had "regularly carried out aerial reconnaissance and commando activities" and near an area where ARVN military operations have been conducted. Documenting its charge that the helicopters strayed off course, the statement claimed that the crash site was 25 kilometers from the assigned flight path and 50 kilometers from Lao Bao--not at Lao Bao as had originally been reported. The statement went on to place the blame for the "regrettable mishap" squarely on the two aircraft's unannounced deviation from their flight plan, and subsequent reports repeated this version of the events.

The U.S. and GVN statements blaming the crash on an attack were acknowledged for the first time in the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 11th, which specifically rejected a 9 April White House statement to that effect and complained that a State Department spokesman had "grossly offended the PRG by stating that this accident was an extremely brutal mockery of the cease-fire agreement." Insisting again that the "mishap" was caused by the helicopter's deviation from course, and noting in passing that the aircraft was piloted by Americans, the statement charged Washington and Saigon with spreading their "false accusations and slandering arguments" in an effort to capitalize on the incident to stir up public opinion. The ICCS, it concluded, should issue strict instructions to its pilots to "avoid similar accidents."

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KOREA

PYONGYANG OFFERS TROOP REDUCTION IF U.S. WITHDRAWS

Confronted with an impasse in the current North-South Korean talks,* Pyongyang has taken its case to the international community in an effort to generate renewed momentum on the Korean question while fixing responsibility on the United States as the chief obstacle to Korean reunification. As part of its effort to put the Korean question in an international context, Pyongyang for the first time has offered to reduce its army strength to 200,000 or less without a corresponding South Korean reduction if the United States withdraws its forces. All past North Korean troop reduction proposals had been linked to mutual cuts in the ROK armed forces to a strength of 100,000 men or less. In a highly unusual move in parallel with the new offer, Pyongyang has addressed an appeal to the U.S. Congress aimed at tapping sentiment favoring a reduction of American troops overseas. At the same time, in a move looking toward support in the next UN General Assembly session, Pyongyang released an appeal to all parliaments and governments that calls for a removal of the UN mantle from the U.S. presence in Korea.

Pyongyang's new troop reduction offer was first contained in a report delivered by Premier Kim Il at the opening day on 5 April of a session of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA). Kim's report, broadcast by Radio Pyongyang on the same day, consisted largely of a review of the DPRK's steps and proposals on opening contacts with the South. Kim made a point, however, of identifying the United States as the main obstacle to the North-South dialogue and charging it with "taking advantage of its dominant position in South Korea" to "obstruct in every way possible the progress of dialogue between North and South Korea." It was in the context of expressing Pyongyang's readiness "for opening wider the door of dialogue that was first opened by our own initiative" that Kim made the offer to "voluntarily reduce the strength of our army to 200,000 men or less if the U.S. forces withdraw from South Korea."

* Neither the political-level discussions nor the Red Cross discussions that took place in Pyongyang last month appear to have made any progress. Apparently deadlocked over matters of substance, both meetings failed to produce even the standard joint statements that had marked all previous full-dress meetings in the series.

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Kim asserted that "the time has come for U.S. authorities to take steps to change their past policy under the present changed situation and for them to withdraw their troops from South Korea." He also urged that "the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) be dissolved in order to remove the obstacles in the way of the peaceful reunification of Korea." He called upon governments of all countries to help put an end to "the interference of the United States in the internal affairs of the Korean people" and to "actively cooperate with us to see the Korean question discussed at the UN General Assembly session this year without fail and some just steps taken for Korea."

Kim's appeal to other countries was also formulated in an SPA letter to all foreign governments adopted on 6 April. Reflecting Pyongyang's tactical move toward spotlighting U.S. responsibility, the letter avoided sharp criticism of the ROK in asserting that none of the DPRK's reunification proposals "has yet been realized because the United States, still occupying South Korea, eggs the South Korean authorities on to make a military showdown by dint of its dominant position and obstruct the progress of the dialogue." Sharpening the point, the letter claimed that "the South Korean authorities say good words when they sit face to face with us for talks but, after going back, break them and reject our realistic proposals for putting the points of agreement between the two sides into concrete practice as 'premature.'" The letter reiterated the new troop reduction offer and stressed that if U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea "the dialogue will make fast progress, North-South relations will be radically improved, and the question of the country's reunification will be smoothly solved in a peaceful way on the principle of national self-determination."

Another letter, adopted by the SPA on the same day and addressed only to the U.S. Congress, failed to mention the troop reduction offer but argued that if the United States truly wants peace in the Far East "there will be no need for it to keep its army in South Korea any longer and artificially maintain the state of military confrontation." The notably temperate letter, which contained no attacks on President Nixon personally or on the Nixon Doctrine, or even the stock references to "U.S. imperialist

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aggression,"* asked Congress to end arms shipments to South Korea and to "refrain from instigating the South Korean authorities to make Koreans fight Koreans by supporting them with arms."

After expressing support for the troop reduction offer adopted at the SPA session, a NODONG SINMUN editorial on 8 April went beyond the wording of the SPA proposal and assumed an even more forthcoming posture on reunification by declaring that "we are ready to take any bold step if it is for a peaceful solution of the reunification question." Without further defining what such a step might be, NODONG SINMUN called upon the UN to take steps to correct its past resolutions on Korea and to contribute to the peaceful reunification of Korea by "taking the cap of the 'UN forces' from the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, making them withdraw from there, and dissolving UNCURK."

TREATMENT OF PAK In a rather gentle warning to the South Koreans, Pyongyang has breached its abstinence from direct personal criticism of ROK President **Pak Chong-hui** for the first time in six months. But there has been no return to the malicious personal vilification of the past, as in the brief period last September and October when the North Koreans renewed the personal attacks on Pak that had been suspended since the 4 July 1972 joint statement. The attacks last fall ended on 8 October--two days before the announcement that the first meeting of the North-South Coordination Committee would be held on 12 October.

The recent reference to Pak by name was contained in an 8 April NODONG SINMUN commentary mildly chiding him for recent speeches calling for military strength. According to the commentary, **Pak** had revealed "the true nature of the South Korean authorities who want the maintenance of tension, not its relaxation, and dream of 'unification by prevailing over communism,' instead of peaceful reunification." The commentary admonished Pak to "behave properly" and "affirmatively respond to the fair and aboveboard proposals of our side for national reunification."

* By contrast, a 30 January NODONG SINMUN editorial on the Vietnam peace agreement harshly attacked the United States in arguing that the settlement would not lead to a reduction of tension in Asia and in charging the United States with obstructing Korean reunification. The editorial called President Nixon an "imperialist war chieftain" and charged that "the U.S. imperialist murderers" had surpassed Hitler's war crimes.

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MOSCOW, PEKING In keeping with its past treatment of
REACTION Pyongyang's initiatives on Korean reunifica-
 tion, Moscow has carried only low-level
commentaries expressing support for the SPA's letter to all
governments calling for help in ending foreign interference in
Korea. Moscow has not commented on the letter addressed to
the U.S. Congress. The only available specific comment on
the troop reduction offer came in a foreign-language commentary
broadcast on 9 April which said that "it is hard to overestimate
the significance of this action" in view of the fact that South
Korea has a "well-equipped army of 600,000." Moscow pointed to
the offer as showing the DPRK's basic "peacefulness" and argued
that the time has come for the United States to "pull its troops
out of South Korea."

Peking, on the other hand, has again offered authoritative
support for the North Korean moves. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
on 11 April expressed Chinese support for Kim's report and the
two SPA letters, but it failed to take specific note of the
troop reduction offer. In a similar show of reluctance to
publicize the offer, an NCNA account of the 8 April NODONG
SINMUN editorial omitted the latter's reference to the offer as
well as the expressed readiness to take "any bold step" toward
reunification. In view of Peking's change toward countenancing
if not indeed approving a continued U.S. military presence in
Asia and elsewhere to counterbalance the Soviets, the Chinese
may find it discreet to sidestep a proposal calling for a U.S.
troop withdrawal.

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MANIFESTO ANNIVERSARY

COMMUNIST CONFERENCE NOTES MOSCOW'S "VANGUARD" ROLE

One of the features of the recently concluded 125th anniversary conference on the Communist Manifesto was the resurrection of the old formula--ignored at the last world communist conference in 1969--that Moscow plays the "vanguard" role in the world communist movement. Although obviously relevant to the issue of Moscow's relations with its East European allies, the reiteration of the formula was probably intended to symbolize the distinction between the Moscow-oriented and Peking-oriented wings of the communist movement. As such, it served to portray the Soviet party as the prime embodiment of the ideals of the Manifesto, but did not necessarily imply that Moscow wished to reassert a claim to be the model and leader of all other communist parties.

Speaking for the host party at the 15 March opening of the East Berlin international conference, SED secretary Kurt Hager characterized the Soviet Union as "the center" of the socialist camp. He declared that "the Soviet Union is and remains the center and main force of the socialist community," adding that history has shown that "in Lenin's party the Soviet Union possesses the most experienced and battle-tested party of the international workers class." The Soviet Union, he said, is the revolutionary "vanguard" and heads the implementation of the Communist Manifesto principles, adding that a communist's attitude toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU is "the decisive touchstone" of his loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. He went on to score "the Maoists" as the arch-transgressors of proletarian internationalism.

This phraseology was absent from the main document of the 1969 world communist conference, presumably because of Moscow's desire to avoid stirring memories of the Czechoslovak episode and because of the attitudes of the Romanians and other independent-minded delegations. Thus the document took the position that "there is no leading center of the international communist movement," and that the parties should coordinate their activities voluntarily. In now identifying the Soviet Union as the center of the socialist camp, Hager in effect reverted to the phraseology of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow international party conference documents.

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The declaration of the 1957 conference, attended by Mao Tse-tung, had identified the Soviet Union as the "head" of "the invincible camp of socialist countries." It also stressed the need for international working class unity to defend "the historic political and social gains effected in the Soviet Union--the first and mightiest socialist power--as well as in the Chinese People's Republic, and in all the socialist countries."

The 1960 conference statement, registering a compromise in the burgeoning Sino-Soviet rivalry for leadership, adopted a diluted formula saying that "communist and workers parties unanimously announce that the generally acknowledged vanguard of the world communist movement has been and will continue to be the CPSU, as the most experienced and tempered unit of the international communist movement."

Discrepancies between the formulations of the two earlier Moscow documents and the 1969 one were ignored by Hager in his remark that the SED would continue to be guided by "the general line of the international communist movement collectively worked out and adopted at the international conferences of 1957, 1960, and 1969."

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